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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Point One: The defendant preserved his objection to the 
introduction of the video taped viewing of the scene of the 
murder which concentrated on the corpse of the victim lying upon 
the couch with her throat slit open and blood upon her blouse. 
He argued for the suppression of the tape in chambers. For some 
reason not explained on the record, the Court failed to have the 
arguments recorded by the court reporter. However, after the 
court ruled against defendant on his motion to suppress the tape, 
the court resumed session with the jury present. The State moved 
for the introduction of the tape, and the defendant brought to 
the court's attention that he objected to the admission, and the 
court had ruled against him. To have said more would have 
impressed the jury more firmly that he did not want them to see 
the highly damaging film. The court noted the objection, and 
allowed the tape to be introduced. Consequently, when the State 
argues in the fourth point of its argument that defendant failed 
to preserve his objection, the State disregards the record. 
Point two: The viewing of the video taped movie of the corpse 
is so shocking and inflammatory, and has so little probative, 
evidentiary value, that its introduction was clearly plain error. 
Defendant should not have had to do more to preserve his 
objection argued in chambers. Every legitimate item of evidence 
which may have been included in the video tape was introduced by 
the Sta£e by other means. There was no essential evidentiary 
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value to the introduction of the tape which out weighed the 
unfair, prejudicial impact it had on the jury. 
Point three: While defendant did make objection to the 
introduction of evidence as to Tammy DiBello's asserted fear of 
defendant, the court's procedure of ruling on the objection by 
taking the objection under advisement and ruling as each item was 
offered on the issue, effectively allowed the evidence to come in 
when defendant could not have expected it to. There was no offer 
of the testimony of Shane Jacobsen to the effect that the victim 
wanted the witness to stay with her over night because she was 
afraid of the defendant. While defendant objected to the 
testimony when given, the court did not rule on the objection 
until three witnesses later. By that time, the evil of the 
testimony could not be prevented by a request that the jury 
disregard it. To have sought to have the jury rehabilitated on 
the point would have impressed on them all the more forcibly Mr. 
Jacobsenf s comments. 
Point four: While the State is correct in arguing that 
defendant did not specify the lines of the transcript in its 
initial brief wherein the prosecutor's misconduct unfairly 
prejudiced the defendant, the defendant's references to the 
closing argument were sufficiently well described as to permit 
the State to delineate the offending portion of the transcript. 
The State has addressed the issue directly, and has courteously 
provided the Court with a copy of the offending comments in its 
Addendum. 
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The State, while referring to the specific comments, suggests 
that perhaps defendant did not object timely to them. Yet, the 
portion of the transcript which the State supplied in its 
addendum clearly indicates that the defendant did timely object. 
Consequently, the Court had access to the offending comments of 
the prosecutor and the defendant's objection. In this case, 
where the State had no compelling evidence of defendant's guilt, 
and the conviction had to be based entirely on circumstantial 
evidence, the misconduct of the prosecutor in arguing that the 
defendant's legal counsel erred in the manner in which he 
presented the evidence, was the final error which resulted in a 
guilty verdict. 
Point five: Without the color videotaped viewing of the corpse 
for two or more continuous minutes, the irrelevant and immaterial 
hearsay evidence that the victim feared the defendant, and the 
prosecutor's unfairly characterizing the defense attorney's 
manner of presenting his case, there was insufficient evidence to 
cast reasonable doubt from the minds of the jurors. There were 
rational, logical conclusions to be drawn from the evidence as 
viewed from the State's point of view which would leave a 
reasonable doubt of defendant's guilt. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT PRESERVED HIS OBJECTION TO THE 
INTRODUCTION OF THE VIDEO TAPE VIEWING OF THE 
VICTIM'S CORPSE 
The s t a t e would have the Court b e l i e v e t h a t because the 
defendant did not s t a t e the reason for h i s o b j e c t i o n to the 
i n t r o d u c t i o n of the video tape on the record, tha t he did not 
o b j e c t * At page 696 of t he t r a n s c r i p t Mr. K e l l e r , t h e 
defendant 's legal counsel, s ta ted upon the S t a t e ' s offer of the 
video tape: 
I previously stated my objection in chambers to 
that [the portion of the tape that has been 
exhibited before the court]. I believe the court 
overruled that objection. 
The court then admitted the video tape. Defendant certainly 
preserved his objection to the video tape by that comment. 
Unfortunately, we do not have a record of the objection to the 
video tape made in chambers. Hence, there is no record of the 
reasoning of the court in admitting the video. Nevertheless, the 
defendant did call to the Court's attention his objection in 
chambers and the fact his objection was denied. Consequently, 
while defendant did not restate the basis of his objection, he 
did note it. 
Because defendant's motion to suppress was heard in chambers 
during the trial of the case, before the same judge who was 
trying the matter, it is distinguishable from State v. Lesley^ 
1State v. Lesley, 672 P.2d 79, 82 (Utah, 19$3). 
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where one judge heard the motion to suppress and another judge, 
some period of time later tried the case. The trial judge here 
would have had well in mind the discussion regarding the 
suppression of the tape. Consequently, to have more formally 
recited again, in the presence of the jury the reasons why 
defendant objected to the introduction of the tape would have 
been superfluous. 
Since the tape was so shocking, and inflammatory, any mention 
of it in the presence of the jury was obviously going to be noted 
by them. Defendant certainly did not want to do more than object 
so as to limit to the extent he was able the damage done by the 
introduction of the film. This court recognized in the Lesley 
decision2 that the grounds for the objection would have to be 
made outside the presence of the Jury^. Yet, here, the record 
reveals that the time of day was close to that when the Judge had 
indicated he wanted to recess (Transcript p. 700), and the 
defendant had only recently argued the grounds for his objection 
to the judge, hence, the defendant did not ask for the jury to be 
excluded. This was not an error, but a judgment call on the part 
of defense counsel as to what was necessary to preserve his 
objection, in view of the court's knowledge of the objection. 
Certainly the State should not now be allowed to successfully 
2id, at 82. 
3ffOf course, to avoid prejudicing the ju ry , procedural steps 
wil l have to be taken in jury t r i a l s to ensure that the court has 
an o p p o r t u n i t y to hear c o u n s e l ' s o b j e c t i o n s o u t s i d e of the 
presence of the jury. '1 
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argue that defendant's failure to reargue the objection a second 
time before the same judge during the same trial prevents him 
from assigning error to the admission. Furthermore, Rule 
103(a)(1) of the Rules of Evidence^, only requires the grounds 
for the objection to be stated if it is not apparent. Defendant 
maintains that in the context of the present case, the grounds 
were apparent to the trial judge. 
POINT II 
IRREGARDLESS OF DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION, IT WAS PLAIN 
ERROR FOR THE COURT TO ALLOW THE VIDEO TAPE TO BE 
SHOWN TO THE JURY 
Irrespective of whether defendant objected timely to the 
introduction of the video tape, the trial court committed error 
in admitting that tape. While the State has admitted that it did 
not assert the video tape had essential evidentiary value, it 
still argues that it was the defendant's duty to see that a 
record was made of his Rule 403 objection to its introduction. 
Defendant submits that the all parties and the Court itself 
equally responsible to see that a record of all proceedings in 
the trial of case are made on the record. Absent a showing that 
defendant specifically waived the transcription of his argument 
to suppress the tape, he is entitled to rely on the Court in 
preserving the record for review. 
^"Objection. In case the ruling is one admitting evidence, 
a timely objection or motion to strike appears of record, stating 
the specific ground of objection, if the specific ground was not 
apparent from the context; . . . ." [emphasis added J. 
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The State admits that there was ample substantive evidence in 
other exhibits that were introduced to !tmake the existence of any 
fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action 
more probable or less probable than it would be without the 
evidence."5,6 
For instance, the pants, belt, socks, boots and the bloody 
blouse the victim was wearing when her body was taken into 
evidence were introduced by the State (Transcript pp. 698-700) 
and identified by the State's witnesses, although never admitted. 
A chart showing the placement of the defendant and victim's 
trailer in the mobile home park was introduced and admitted 
(Transcript pp. 52-53) Another chart of the trailer court was 
explained to the jury, but never admitted (Transcript pp. 501). 
Photographs of the inside of the victim's trailer (Transcript, 
pp. 722-725) as well as specific photographs of the victim's 
corpse (Transcript pp. 54-55, 291-292) as well as a stab wound on 
the body (Transcript pp. 304-305) and pictures of the trailer 
door, (Transcript pp. 50-51, 338-341) were all identified and 
discussed by witnesses, and introduced into evidence. Hence, the 
State is hard put to argue that the video tape was necessary to 
make the charge of first degree murder more probable. 
^Rule 401, Utah Rules of Evidence. 
^At page 17 of the Respondent's brief it is stated, 
"Although there were other photographs of the body that were 
admitted, he [referring to defendant] does not allege that these 
were gruesome or prejudicial. He appears to argue that the video 
tape was prejudicial because it was cumulative of other evidence." 
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The State has argued that photographic evidence of the corpse 
is not inadmissible simply because it is cumulative.? Defendant 
agrees as far as that argument goes, but the State fails to make 
a distinction between evidence which is merely cumulative, and 
that which has less relevance than it does unfair prejudice." 
As the State so amply discusses, at pp. 18 and 19 of its Brief, 
and as the Defendant mentions on page 24 of his Brief, this Court 
has determined that before "potentially prejudicial photographs 
of the victim1 s body" are to be admitted, the Court must find 
that the potential undue prejudice of the photographs is 
outweighed by the "essential" evidentiary value of the 
photographs.9 in Garcia^Q, still pictures of the stab wounds in 
the body were admitted properly. The Court found they were 
essential. Here, in addition to photographs of the stab wounds, 
the State has introduced over defendant's objection video movies 
of the corpse. This cumulative, shocking and inflammatory 
evidence was not essential to the State's case. 
The State argues that the video tape showing Tammy DiBello's 
body for two minutes is not as gruesome as photographs which were 
found to be objectional in other cases which have come before the 
7". . . The mere fact that the evidence was cumulative of 
other testimony shouLd not render the photographs inadmissible." 
Page 22 of Respondent's Brief. 
8Rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence. 
9State v. Garcia, 663 P.2d 60, 64 (Utah, 1983). 
Instate v. Garcia, ibid. 
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Court** and that the tape is "not completely devoid of 
evidentiary value,"12
 anc[ indicates that the video viewing of 
the body "is no more graphic than many currently popular movies 
and television programs. "13 Apparently, the State is arguing 
that if the video is not "complete devoid of evidentiary value" 
it is admissible, in spite of Rule 403, and irrespective of its 
degree of gruesomeness. 
Certainly, this Court should not be called upon to determine 
whether the Court erred in admitting the video pictures of 
victim's bodies based on their degree of gruesomeness! Defendant 
disputes Respondent's assertion the view of the body is no more 
gruesome than current television shows. It shows in color the 
slit throat of the corpse, lying on the couch, and without moving 
from that scene, remains so fixed for over two minutes! 
The degree of gruesomeness is not direct issue. As this Court 
stated in Garcia*^, Cloud*5, Poe*6 , and Wells*?, the issue is 
whether the pictures are necessary for the State to prove 
relevant evidence. Here, defendant allowed, without objection, 
evidence depicting the scene, the stab wounds and bruises on the 
**Respondent's Brief, second paragraph at page 20. 
^Respondentfs Brief, first paragraph, at p#ge 21. 
^Respondentf s Brief, page 22. 
Instate v. Garcia, ibid. 
*
5State v. Cloud, 722 P.2d 750 (Utah, 1986). 
16State v. Poe, 441 P.2d 512, 514-515 (Utah, 1986). 
*
7State v. Wells, 603 P.2d 810, 813 (Utah, 1983). 
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victim to be admitted. Certainly, after those pictures were 
admitted properly, there is no good reason, except as this Court 
stated in Wells*8 to introduce the video tape for the "hoped for 
emotional impact on the jury." 
Clearly, the Court abused ies discretion in allowing the video 
tape to be admitted. Rule *03 requires the Court to make a 
determination that injustice will not result before cumulative, 
highly emotional evidence such as this tape are introduced. 19 
This Court is called upon to reverse the defendant's conviction 
to correct this manifest injustice. 
POINT III 
IT WAS MATERIAL PREJUDICE FOR THE COURT TO ALLOW 
INADMISSIBLE HEARSAY EVIDENCE OF THE DECEDENT'S 
STATE OF MIND TO REMAIN BEFORE THE JURY 
After the jury was selected in this case, the court excused 
them to hear the defendant's motion to suppress the evidence of 
the victim's alleged fear of the defendant, which the State 
sought to introduce by means of Rule 804(b)(5) of the Rules of 
Evidence. (Transcript pp. 4-9, 10). Defendant based his motion 
to suppress primarily upon the Wauneka.20 xhe defendant argued 
that since there was no dispute as to the fact that the victim 
had been murdered, it was totally irrelevant what her state of 
18State v. Wells, ibid at 813. 
19State v. McCardell, 652 P.2d 942, 944 (Utah, 1982) cite 
with approval in State vTRoyball, 710 P.2d 168, 169 (Utah, 1985) 
2QState v. Wauneka, 560 P.2d 1377, (Utah, 1977). 
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mind was at the time of her death. 21 The Court agreed and 
granted the motion to suppress evidence of Tammy's state of mind. 
(Transcript p. 24, 1. 16-17). Defendant then asked that the 
ruling apply to any evidence of which defendant had no knowledge 
on the issue. (Transcript, p. 24, 1. 19-22). The court did not 
make a ruling, but stated: HWe won't make that ruling until--
I'm not going to prejudge." (Transcript p. 24, 1. 23-24). 
Subsequently, the Court modified its ruling even more, and stated 
that it would exclude the hearsay, state of mind evidence from 
the State's opening statement only, and then rule on each 
witnesses testimony after the foundation for that testimony was 
laid.22 
The Court's ruling on the suppression of the state of mind of 
the victim was in error, and the State's present position that 
21"i think essentially that what the Utah Supreme Court was 
saying is that the state of mind of the deceased, her attitude 
toward the defendant, her fear perhaps of the defendant, is not 
in issue in a homicide case where there is no question of 
suicide, no question of accidental death or a question of self-
defense, whereas in this case it's a whodunit. That is to say, 
the defendant denies any involvement whatsoever in the homicide. 
There is a great danger in allowing the jury to hear evidence and 
testimony from individuals who say, well, the man's wife told me 
she was afraid of him or that he might injure her, because the 
jury may simply conclude from that, well, then the defendant must 
be guilty." Transcript, page 6. 
22Transcript pp. 25-26: "The court is going to reserve its 
ruling as to the introduction of hearsay statements until such 
time as the state has put on its case and laid a foundation on 
which statements can be offered in evidence. At that time the 
defense may raise the motion and object to the admission of said 
evidence and the court will then make a ruling as to whether or 
not the hearsay statements are admissible and come within the 
exception to the hearsay rule." 
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Shane Jacobsen's testimony quoted on page 14 of Respondent's 
Brief, should not have been allowed to stand before the Court. 
The case cited by defendant at the motion to suppress, State v. 
Wauneka,23 clearly prohibits the introduction of this testimony 
as being irrelevant.24 There was no good reason for the court to 
require the defendant to object as each witness was qualified to 
offer the evidence of Tammy's state of mind. The very evil which 
should have been anticipated by such a ruling occurred. Without 
warning, and foundation, Shane Jacobsen testified that Tammy was 
afraid of the defendant and wanted him to sleep at her house as a 
consequence. (Transcript p. 162.) Defendant immediately 
approached the bench and a discussion ensued. The Court did not 
rule on the issue until Mr. Keller brought up the matter again 
when the State began to qualify Tinley Gibbons as a witness. 
(Transcript p. 277). Mr Keller approached the bench and the 
Court excluded the jury from the court room. The court then 
stated that he was not going to allow the witness to state her 
answers to the prosecutor's questions unless the jury was 
present, and then he was going to let Mr. Keller object. 
(Transcript p. 279). Obviously, the trial court did not 
understand the damaging effect, and materially prejudicial effect 
2^State y, Wauneka, ibid. 
2^See Appellant's brief at pp. 13-14, and State v. Wauneka 
ibid, at 1381. "Whether the victim loved or hated the defendant 
or whether she feared him or ignored him throws no light on hi 
guilt or innocence. The jurors were most likely to believe tha 
the statements made by the wife were true, and that the defendan 
had beaten her and threatened to kill her; therefore, he did kil 
her." 
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of the state of mind, hearsay testimony. The defendant again 
referred to the Court to the Wauneka decision, and to the 
weighing test of Rule 403. (Transcript p. 283). At page 286 of 
the Transcript, the defendant then expressed that the Court had 
never ruled on his objection to Shane Jacobsen's testimony.25 
The Court never instructed the jury on the matter, and the answer 
was allowed to remain before the jury. 
The State argues now that the answer was permissible because 
defendant had introduced evidence to the effect that the blood on 
the door of the trailer was from a bloody nose that Tammy got 
when she tripped and fell after leaving her neighbor's trailer 
with the defendant on the evening before her death.26 yet 
defendant never argued with the fact that Tammy was murdered, and 
the evidence of her state of mind can only be relevant if the 
issue of the means of death was at issue. 
25 Mr. Keller: When shane Jacobsen was testifying he made 
the statement and I entered an objection and went to the bench 
and asked the opportunity to make the objection outside the 
presence of the jury. 
Mr. Jacobsen made the flat statement, I believe, that the 
deceased was afraid of her husband. 
The Court: Yes, I have that. 
Mr. Keller: And therefore she asked him to stay. I make that 
objection because the Court has not made a final ruling on that 
and I want the record clear that I am objecting to that statement 
coming in if the Court rules in our favor. I think that's all 
that need to be done is my objection for the record. 
The Court: And that answer will be stricken. If the court 
determines otherwise, the court can reverse itself and allow that 
answer to remain. We can recall and reestablish that issue. 
^Respondent's Brief, p. 15. 
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The Court erred in allowing the testimony by Shane Jacobsen to 
remain before the jury, and based on the reasoning in the 
Wauneka^7 decision, the defendant's conviction should be 
reversed. 
POINT IV 
THE PROSECUTt^'S MISCONDUCT TAINTED THE ENTIRE 
PROCEEDINGS 
While the State is correct when it states that the defendant 
failed to specify the pages of the transcript containing the 
prosecutor's misconduct during closing argument. However, the 
defendant's argument delineated that misconduct sufficiently well 
for the State to locate the same in the transcript, refer to it 
by page in its brief,28
 and include the pages referred to in its 
Addendum to its Brief. Consequently, this Court has had the 
opportunity to review the offending passages. The case cited by 
the State for the proposition that failure to refer to the pages 
of the record requires the court to assume regularity, State v. 
Olmos29
 w a s not decided on the basis of the defendant's failure 
to refer to pages of the transcript, but on the Court lack of 
jurisdiction of the subject matter. The case cited in dicta on 
the issue at hand, State v. Jones,30 involves jury instructions. 
2?State y, Wauneka, ibid. 
^Respondent's Brief, page 8, and Addendum. 
29State v. Olmos, 712 P.2d 287 (Utah, 1986). 
30state v. Jones, 657 P.2d 1263, 1267 (Utah, 1982). 
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POINT V 
THE EVIDENCE INTRODUCED WITHOUT ERROR, STANDING 
ALONE, WAS INSUFFICIENT TO OVERCOME REASONABLE 
DOUBT AS TO DEFENDANT'S GUILT 
Whether there was sufficient evidence to convict the defendant 
beyond a reasonable doubt as a matter of law, depends upon what 
evidence the jury had the right to receive.33 jf the evidence is 
"so inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds 
must have entertained a reasonable doubt as to [defendant's] 
guiltff3^, when the evidence is viewed in a light most favorable 
to the verdict, then the Court must reverse. 
Defendant takes exception to certain implications of the 
State's recitation of the evidence. Firstly, defendant submits 
that there was no evidence other than defendant's testimony that 
Tammy was bleeding because of her fall. None of the witnesses 
counterdicted defendant's testimony that she did in fact fall and 
cut her mouth. Though defendant had blood on his own body, there 
was no indication as to whose blood it was. Since defendant 
explained how Tammy's blood or his own could have been on him, 
and his truck there is no reason to believe the jury would 
believe it was the result of the murder. There was no evidence 
to indicate the blood traces on his skin and on the instrument 
33state v. McCardell, 562 P.2d 942 (Utah, 1982): "Th 
question of the sufficiency of evidence to support the convictic 
will necessarily depend upon a determination of what evidence wa 
properly before the jury.11 
34State v. Christensen, 729 P.2d 610 (Utah, 1986) 
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handles in the truck were the result of the murder. The state 
did not introduce any evidence that Tammy's body was ever 
transported in the truck. The two strands of hair in Tammy's 
left had could not be identified as being from the defendant, and 
the one strand of hear found in her right hand could only be 
identified as being "similar11. In other words, it couldn't be 
excluded as being his. None of the three strands of hair could 
be identified as being defendants. (Transcript pp. 436-437). 
Sonja Fajen, whose testimony is recorded at pp. 257-274 of the 
transcript, did not hear an argument about clothing as the State 
implies at p. 12 of its brief, and she did not hear a loud truck 
for at least a half an hour after she heard the door to the 
DiBello trailer slam. 
Chris Graham, whose testimony is recorded at pp. 496-517, 
indicated in his testimony that he did hear a women tell a man to 
take his clothes out of the trailer, but he could not tell who 
the man and women were, or which trailer the talking was coming 
from. 
Consequently, the defendant submits that the jury did not have 
sufficient evidence as a matter of law to exclude every 
reasonable hypotheses except defendant's guilt^5# Since the 
evidence in this case is purely circumstantial, the Court is 
bound to look upon it with caution, and find that it excludes 
every reasonable hypothesis except the guilt of the defendant.36 
35State v. Schad, 24 U.2d 255, 470 P.2d 246 (1970). 
36id. 
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Since it does not, defendant is entitled to an acquittal, or at 
least a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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